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Fe a t u r e R e v i e w
Brereton Greenhous, The Making of Billy Bishop
(Toronto: Dundurn Press, 2002), $29.95, 232 pages,
ISBN 1-55002-390-X.

T

he media was recently ablaze
with news of a controversial
book about the career of Great War
ace Billy Bishop. The description
of this book in an industry periodical noted that Bishop’s reputation is “put through the wringer by
revisionist historian Brereton
Greenhous,” and that “German
records do not corroborate Bishop’s claims, which were taken at
face value by Allied authorities desperate for a hero.”1 About a month
later, the headline of a Torontobased newspaper caught my attention: “Billy Bishop a liar, book
claims.”2 For days the news media
circulated stories about Bishop, his
career, and the provocative new biography. People were aghast that the
author, a former historian with the
Department of National Defence,
made such accusations about one
of our nation’s military heroes.
This is not the first time that
Bishop’s war record has come under attack. In 1982 the National
Film Board released a documentary entitled The Kid Who Couldn’t
Miss. Rather than portraying Bishop

as the hero we all had learned about
in history class, director Paul
Cowan painted a different image of
Bishop’s life. Most notable was the
thesis that the 2 June 1917 mission
(which won Bishop the Victoria
Cross) never occurred. While
Greenhous’ book may not raise the
same patriotic fervour as The Kid
Who Couldn’t Miss, its thesis parallels that of the film. Some might
go as far as to say that this work is
an attempt to vindicate the NFB
production. As well, it is worth
noting that Greenhous has addressed this topic before; over a
decade ago he wrote an article for
the Canadian Historical Review
highlighting flaws in Bishop’s
record and commenting that the
record was largely composed of
unsupported claims.3 The Making
of Billy Bishop carries on with this
theme, claiming that Bishop’s career was a combination of flukes,
lucky breaks, high-society manipulations, and propagandistic desires.
Greenhous further argues that
higher levels of command sanctioned Bishop’s imagined exploits,
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be it for the creation of a hero
analogous to the Red Baron or for
the purposes of acknowledging the
Canadian contribution to the air
war.4
As most people will recall from
their history lessons, Billy Bishop
was the British Empire’s greatest
scoring ace in the Great War. Of
special note was the daring dawn
attack in June 1917. On that fateful
morning he departed from his
squadron’s base, crossed enemy
lines, and attacked a German aerodrome single-handedly. During this
attack he destroyed three aircraft,
and his own machine took substantial damage before he began his
flight back to base. The reason for
the dawn attack was to strike the
aerodrome at its most vulnerable
time, as the aircraft were being prepared for the day’s missions.
Bishop was flying alone that morning, despite attempts to persuade
colleagues to join him.
Bishop filed a Combat Report
after his return that morning, identifying as accurately as possible the
location of the attack, the damage
inflicted, and the enemy aircraft
engaged. This report, along with a
recommendation for the Victoria
Cross from his squadron commander, would make its way to the
higher echelons of the Royal Flying

1
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Corps for review. Senior officers
in the British command investigated the matter fully, reviewing the
Combat Report, Squadron records,
and other supporting documentation. The Victoria Cross was finally
awarded to Bishop on 11 August
1917 after roughly two and a half
months of investigation. King
George V presented Bishop his Victoria Cross on 30 August at Buckingham Palace. Also presented at
this time were the Distinguished
Service Order and Military Cross
that Bishop had previously been
awarded.
Greenhous attempts to establish that Bishop’s Great War military career, and in particular the
daring dawn attack, was a mixture
of propagandistic inventions, embellishments, and elaborate yarns.
He focuses on this dawn attack as a
central point of his thesis, stating
that this mission did not occur the
way that the Combat Report indicates. What is ironic is that the author himself supports portions of
this same Combat Report, spending several pages investigating various paths Bishop might have flown
that morning. This leads to a simple question: if Greenhous feels that
the mission never occurred and the
subsequently filed Combat Report
was a complete fabrication, why try
to identify a flight path that supports
it?
Greenhous also spends a considerable amount of space (two
chapters) examining Bishop’s seventy-two career victories. During
this review he raises questions
about eyewitness accounts (or the
absence of same). What is impressive about this section is that most
books simply rattle of the list of
victories like a laundry list of facts.
Greenhous acknowledges the work
of historians Christopher Shores,
Norman Franks, and Russell Guest
in this area and refers to it repeatedly throughout the book. 5
Greenhous himself acknowledges
with regret that there is a lack of
accurate records from the period
he is investigating.
The book does, however, raise
some interesting questions. For
example, Bishop wore, as part of

his military medals, the 1914-15
Star, awarded to military personnel who fought in France during
those years. Bishop, however, did
not arrive in France as part of the
Royal Flying Corps until two weeks
into 1916. The fact that Bishop was
not awarded this medal is supported by documents at the National Archives of Canada.6
Is there enough information to
support Greenhous’ main thesis? He
does make extensive use of Bishop’s original Combat Reports and
letters home to various members
of his family, as well as information from some German Weekly Air
Activity reports from the period.
The lack of corroborating information from the German reports is,
for Greenhous, a key piece of evidence to support his claim that
Bishop could not have achieved the
victories he claimed. Strangely, he
cannot identify the origins of these
Activity Reports, which have made
their way into Canadian archives.7
This lack of information was
evident in many of the reports and
war diaries of the Great War. Certainly those who were serving in
1917 could appreciate the context
in which reports like Bishop’s were
written and filed. It is not inconceivable that many of the participants of the Great War exaggerated
or diminished aspects of their reports or memories. As well, nearly
all of the participants who wrote,
compiled, or filed these original
reports have passed on, leaving
their content and the mysteries of
their lack of existence to conventional interpretation.
The inconsistency of information does not account for the errors and omissions in the book. In
reviewing the sources used, some
errors were noted. Greenhous identifies Bishop’s squadron commander during his last days of
service in 1917 as Major W.J.C.
Kennedy-Cochran-Patrick. The periodical Cross and Cockade identifies the Commanding Officer of 60
Squadron who succeeded Major
Jack Scott as Captain ‘Pat’
Cochrane-Patrick, subsequently
promoted to Major as a result of
his posting and appointment. The

2
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periodical’s version is confirmed
in Above the Trenches.
Despite such faults, the book
is a good read. It raises some interesting questions and introduces
a different interpretation of the actions of one of our nation’s heroes.
In the end it will be up to the reader
to decide if Greenhous has proven
his case. After reading and reviewing his work, I can honestly say that
I am not convinced. Just as there
is insufficient information to prove
Bishop’s claims, so too is there insufficient evidence to support the
thesis Greenhous puts forward.
Greenhous does concede one
point which was mirrored in an
editorial in the Kitchener-Waterloo
newspaper in this statement: “The
hard historic facts, the ones that are
beyond dispute, show that Bishop
was a daring, courageous flyer who
risked his life every time he took
his plane over enemy lines.”8
Steven Dieter
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

6.
7.
8.

Quill & Quire, March 2002, p.26.
Toronto Star, 16 April 2002, p.A1.
Brereton Greenhous, “The Sad Case of
Billy Bishop, VC,” Canadian Historical
Review 70/2 (1989), pp.223-227.
Greenhous, The Making of Billy Bishop,
pp.26-27.
Christopher Shores, Norman Franks and
Russell Guest, Above the Trenches: A
Complete Record of the Fighter Aces and
the units of the British Empire Air Forces
1915-1920. (London: Grub Street, 1990).
Greenhous, The Making of Billy Bishop,
pp.40-41.
Greenhous, The Making of Billy Bishop,
p.219.
“Billy Bishop remains a hero,” The
Record, 16 May 2002, p.A8.

*****
Lita-Rose Betcherman, Ernest
Lapointe: Mackenzie King’s
Great Quebec Lieutenant (Toronto: University of Toronto Press,
2002), $60.00, 426 pages, ISBN 08020-3575-2.

U

nable to speak French, and
seemingly ignorant of Quebec’s
political culture, Prime Minister
William Lyon Mackenzie King entrusted to his “soulmate” and loyal
Quebec lieutenant, the Minister of
Justice, Ernest Lapointe, the task
of ensuring the government’s policies would not agitate Quebeckers

2
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and divide Canadians. Lita-Rose
Betcherman’s study of Lapointe’s
political career is not surprisingly
fixated on the French/English dichotomy in Canadian federal politics. Several domestic crises, including Duplessis’s Padlock Law
and Aberhart’s legislation restricting civil liberties, displayed
Lapointe’s inconsistency in dealing
with this potentially divisive dichotomy. Readers of this journal
and scholars of the British Empire
will find Betcherman’s account of
Lapointe’s active involvement in
Canada’s foreign policy development informative. As a compact
theorist and Canadian nationalist,
Lapointe was actively engaged in
pursuing greater political autonomy
for Canada. With the lessons of the
conscription crisis of 1917 always
in mind, Lapointe was determined
to prevent Canada from becoming
torn apart by another European
imperialist war.
The combination of Lapointe’s
determination to keep Canada
united during the Second World
War and his unwavering loyalty to
King (which King, as Betcherman
convincingly demonstrates, was
willing to manipulate selfishly in
order to take pressure off himself),
left Lapointe emotionally and physically exhausted in the last years of
his life. After a successful federal
campaign in 1940, which followed
the brutal Quebec provincial election of 1939, Lapointe had won
Quebeckers’ support and loyalty on
the promise that King’s government
would not impose conscription. The
combination of Lapointe’s death,
increasing casualties, a lengthy war,
and a decreasing number of volunteers left King vulnerable to the proconscription camp’s demands.
Betcherman hypothesizes that
Lapointe would not have allowed the
conscription plebiscite to take place
across the country and leave
Quebeckers at the mercy of the
English majority.
By focusing on Lapointe’s loyalty to King and his attempts to
keep the French/English dichotomy
from becoming too divisive,
Betcherman’s triumphant analysis
of Lapointe’s political career leaves

several questions unanswered. For
instance, Betcherman never fully
explains the complexities behind
the Globe and Mail’s criticisms and
reserved praise in their obituary to
Lapointe. Although Lapointe was a
consistent contributor on King’s
western campaigns, it is never quite
clear how or if Lapointe felt compelled to sell his nationalist views
to English Canadians. Did
Lapointe’s French-speaking Canadian nationalism differ from English-speaking Canadian nationalism? To what extent, if any, did
Lapointe’s nationalist policies alienate the rest of Canada from Quebec? Lastly, given Lapointe’s authoritative-like influence on King’s
decisions and his constant appeals
to leave office, why did Lapointe not
firmly establish his own predecessor? These questions arise only
because of Betcherman’s skilful
analysis of Lapointe’s dominant influence on Quebec politics and
King.
SBW
*****
Clive M. Law, ed., Making Tracks:
Tank Production in Canada (Ottawa: Service Publications, 2001),
$24.95 paper, 55 pages, ISBN 1894581-06-7

T

o compile this brief history of
tank manufacturing in Canada,
Clive Law has drawn material from
a number of authoritative government reports, particularly a postwar report by the Army Historical
Section, an eight-volume history of
vehicle production by the Army Engineering Development Board, and
Kennedy’s History of the Department of Munitions and Supply.
The result is a fascinating and well
illustrated account of a manufacturing program that yielded 5794 tanks
over five years, a small number
compared to the 65,000 produced
in the United States but impressive
nonetheless. As Law so nicely puts
it, the story can be read either as a
glass half-empty or a glass half-full:
“The generous reader can take comfort in the fact that Canadian manufacturers created an industry where
none existed before ... A more pessimistic reader may note that Ca-
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nadian production seemed unable
to deliver the right goods at the
right time and, as a result, Canada’s army in North-West Europe
used primarily US-produced
tanks.”
CA
*****
Dale McClare, ed., The Letters of
a Young Canadian Soldier During
World War I: P. Winthrop McClare
of Mount Uniacke, N.S.
(Dartmouth, NS: Brook House
Press, 2000), $19.95 paper, 194
pages, ISBN 1-896986-02-1.
Hattie E. Perry, Soldiers of the
King (Barrington, NS: ), $25.00,
177 pages, ISBN 0-9691458-6-1.

T

hese two books complement
each other nicely. One focuses
on the life of a young Nova Scotian,
the other contains stories of servicemen from one part of the province. Winthrop McClare of Mount
Uniacke enlisted in the Halifax Rifles on 26 April 1915, at age seventeen. On 6 February 1917, he joined
the 24th Battalion (Victoria Rifles of
Canada) in France, went into the
trenches two months later, and died
in action east of Vimy just after his
nineteenth birthday. He has no
known grave: Winnie’s is one of the
names on the Vimy Memorial.
The Letters, a book better in
its parts than the whole, reveals the
thoughts and describes the actions
of a naive young man suddenly
thrust into a wider world far from
Nova Scotia. He writes about life
on McNab’s Island in Halifax Harbour, Upper Dibgate, Kent,
Shoreham, Sussex, and France.
Winnie’s spelling is atrocious, but
he gives an unvarnished account of
life in the Canadian Corps. He
yearned to go into action, but spent
most of his time in camps in England. On 6 November 1916, he
writes to his brother, “I am haveing
a pretty good time just now, but I
don’t know how long it is going to
last.” Winnie found England cold
and noted the number of loose
women who thronged the Strand in
London: “An awfull lot of fellows
that go to London come back in
bad shape and are sent to V.D. hos-
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pitals.” His last letter describes his
part in the battle for Vimy Ridge:
“…it was Hell. I got a small splinter through the fleshy part of my
shoulder. It was very slight and I
went through it all with it.” A few
weeks later, on 5 May, German artillery enfiladed the trenches of the
24th Battalion, killing McClare. The
book also contains two letters written by Roy McClare, Winnie’s
cousin. One reflects the feelings of
many ordinary soldiers about the
war. The other, dated 11 November 1918, is a vivid description of
how a lightly wounded soldier, another cousin of Winnie’s, simply
faded away in hospital. Both are
unique contributions to the literature on the Great War.
Hattie Perry’s book puts faces
to the names she saw on local war
memorials. Soldiers of the King
contains long and short biographies
of men from Barrington Municipality and Clark’s Harbour who served
in the First World War, many of
them in the Purple Feather Brigade,
the 219th Battalion. Just before
embarkation, almost the whole battalion went AWOL, but only one man
failed to turn up in time to board
RMS Olympic on 12 October 1916.
Of the sixty-seven men from the
Barrington area who went overseas
with the First Contingent, eighteen
died overseas.
The letters in the book echo the
sentiments of Winnie McClare. Several have a fatalistic tone. One soldier, buried for three days in a crater on Vimy Ridge, writes, “I wasn’t
in the best of shape, but I was
spared. I’ve a strong belief that no
one dies until their time comes.”
Warren Nickerson gives a detailed
description of the blood lust that
comes over soldiers as they charge:
“…you are almost insane for the
moment.” He mentions encountering German soldiers aged thirteen
and fourteen, and a woman and four
children hiding in a front-line dugout. Norman Smith went to sea at
age twelve, and did forty-two trips
across the Atlantic as the captain of
ships carrying explosives; he was
known as Dynamite Smith and
Cussin’ Norman. He survived the
war. Captain Horatio Brennan was

here is an Oxford Companion
to almost everything these
days; one needs an Oxford Companion to Oxford Companions to
sort them all out. This isn’t necessarily a bad thing. A good reference
book is a treasure trove for casual
readers and professional historians
alike.
This hefty and expensive volume boasts 1,300 entries by 150
specialists, and editor Richard
Holmes (author of several superb
popular works on twentieth-century
warfare) has done a splendid job
assembling it all. Reference books
are supposed to save time, but readers should be forewarned that this
one is not likely to. Searching one
day for quick information on
Kosovo, I was utterly waylaid by the
Ks: Kabul, Kalashnikov, Kasserine,
Kissinger, Korea, etc.
I have a few reservations: the
book is poorly illustrated (it is
hardly illustrated at all) and surprisingly weak on economic aspects
of warfare. Moreover, the editors
at Oxford saw fit to vandalize the
back cover with a photograph of

4
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less lucky. He brought his tug, the
Stella Maris, close to the Mont
Blanc just as it blew up in Halifax
Harbour on 6 December 1917; he
was decapitated. Walter Nickerson,
a member of his crew, lived to tell
his story. Courtney Smith threw
himself on a grenade on 5 November 1917, saving the lives of his
comrades but losing his own. On
the day the war ended, a sniper shot
Clarage Sholds as he succoured
wounded soldiers. The book contains many photos, and it is easy to
see why British soldiers were impressed with the physiques of the
“colonials.” They were fine looking
men, all gone now. But at least some
of their stories have been saved for
all time, thanks to the dedication
of a local historian.
JL
*****
Richard Holmes, ed., The Oxford
Companion to Military History
(Don Mills, ON: Oxford University
Press, 2001), $79.95, 1048 pages,
ISBN 0-19-866209-2.

T

Holmes that looks like a rejected
driver’s license picture. Readers
who spend this much on a book can
reasonably expect decent cover art.
These quibbles aside, put away the
junk and make room on your reference shelf for this impressive
work of scholarship.
A final aside: I note on the inside flap that Oxford has already
produced companions to Australian and New Zealand military history. I am tempted to cry out, in
the manner of the famous recruitment poster, “Come on, Canada!”
or perhaps, “Allons-y, Canadiens!”
Surely it’s time for our own companion.
GB
*****
William O. Bryant, Cahaba Prison
and the Sultana Disaster
(Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama
Press [distributed in Canada by
Scholarly Book Services], 2001),
$32.95, 180 pages, ISBN 0-81731133-5.

W

ar is full of tragedy, but some
tragedies are more poignant
than others. A case in point is the
fate the befell a significant portion
of the 5000 Union soldiers incarcerated in Cahaba prison in Alabama during the US Civil War.
Cahaba had all the hallmarks of a
typical Civil War prison: organized
in a rush, established in a less than
desirable location, overcrowded,
inadequate sanitary provisions, a
brutal commandant. Nevertheless,
its death rate was considerably
lower than the most notorious of
Confederate prison camps,
Andersonville, a fact which can be
put down to the assistance of some
local philanthropists, a guard commander who did his best to improve
conditions in the camp, and the
existence of a spring near the camp
which provided fresh water. Still,
it was a ragged and bedraggled
group of former POWs who filed
out of Cahaba in the spring of 1865
to begin the return journey to their
homes in the north. They would
travel up the Mississippi River by
steamboat to Cairo, Illinois, where
the captives would be officially released. When it left Vicksburg, the

4
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paddle-wheeler Sultana, only two
years old, was desperately overcrowded with as many as 2200 passengers (mostly former prisoners
of war) on board; indeed, they almost capsized the boat at Helena,
Arkansas, when they rushed to one
side of the decks to have a picture
taken. Many of these unfortunate
men would not see home, for early
on the morning of 27 April 1865,
not far from Memphis, Tennessee,
the boilers on the Sultana exploded, and the ensuing fire and
panic claimed as many as 1600
lives; it was the largest maritime
disaster of its kind in American
history.
Bryant brings the tale of
Cahaba and the sad fate of its inmates to life with great story-telling skill in this absorbing, if a little disjointed, book. He has a lyrical turn of phrase, and nicely captures both the despair and the dignity of these soldiers who suffered
so much and then lost it all when
freedom seemed so near at hand.
The Sultana disaster, one of the
little-known episodes of the US
Civil War, deserves to be remembered. Bryant points out that, because of the shifting Mississippi, it
is not known exactly where the
steamboat came to grief and where
its remains lie. Until the wreck is
discovered, this book will stand as
a remembrance of the tragedy.
LT
*****
Gerald Astor, The Bloody Forest:
Battle for the Huertgen: September 1944 - January 1945 (Novato,
CA: Presidio Press, 2000), $29.95
US, 393 pages, ISBN 0-89141-699-4.

T

he battle to clear the fiftysquare-mile Huertgen Forest,
south of the German city of Aachen,
is one of the least known actions of
the campaign in north-west Europe.
Overshadowed by the airborne
landings at Arnhem (which occurred
near the beginning of the Huertgen
fighting) and the Battle of the Bulge
(which occurred near the end), it
was nevertheless one of the costliest actions: it resulted in 24,000
American casualties due to enemy

action, and another 9,000 to frostbite or trenchfoot (fewer casualties
than the German defenders sustained). Indeed, there is more than
a passing resemblance to the battles of the Western Front in the
Great War; in the first month in the
Huertgen, almost continuous fighting by the 9th Infantry Division and
the 3rd Armored Division gained
only about 3,500 yards of enemy
territory, at a cost of some 4,500
casualties.
It was also, as Astor argues in
this compelling and fast-paced
book, one of the most ill-conceived
and badly-directed campaigns of the
war. Again, the comparisons with
the First World War are striking:
an operation which, on a strategic
level, was based on flawed assumptions; senior commanders who had
little appreciation of the tactical
challenges faced by the troops;
schedules which were so finely balanced that they left no room for the
kind of normal delays which beset
any military operation; mid-level
officers who exaggerated the success of their units in action reports
to avoid being blamed when things
went wrong; heavy losses among
company grade officers and NCOs;
and poor communication between
various levels of command. Even
more serious, as far as Astor is
concerned, is that no one in the
American forces showed much inclination to learn from the mistakes
of the Huertgen; they were repeated
in the Bulge, and later in the Rhine
crossings. This, perhaps, is the
most unfortunate aspect of a campaign filled with misfortune, so
Astor ends with a plea: just as they
expect accolades when things go
right, senior military commanders
must also be held accountable when
things go wrong.
CA
*****
C.J. Jeronimus, ed., Travels by
His Highness Duke Bernhard of
Saxe-Weimar-Eisenach through
North America in the Years 1825
and 1826, trans. William
Jeronimus (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 2001),
$63.00 US, 557 pages, ISBN 07618-1970-3.
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D

uke Bernhard was one of the
greatest soldiers of his day. A
veteran of the battles of Linz,
Wagram, Quatre Bras, and Waterloo, Inspector of the Infantry of the
Third General Command, divisional commander during the Belgian Revolution, Commander-inChief of the Dutch East Indies Army,
Bernhard was also a cosmopolite
(he declined to accept the Crown of
Greece when it was offered to him
in 1829) and world traveller. He
spent many months travelling
through Europe as guest of various
monarchs (many of whom were his
relatives), and in 1825-26 made an
extended tour of North America. He
landed in Boston and eventually
visited most of the major cities of
the eastern seaboard (including
stops in Upper and Lower Canada).
Because his primary interest was
in military history and fortifications, this diary will be a boon to
students of the period. He comments at length on the military history of the places he visited, the
naval and military strength of the
various garrisons, and the
strengths and weaknesses of the
defences. He was, for example,
rather critical of one of Colonel
MacGregor’s battalions of the Montreal garrison (“not quite first
class”) but complimented them on
their intricate drill, and was also
most impressed by the skill and
accuracy of Major Wallace’s artillery unit. He was less impressed
with the fortifications of Fort Lennox
on Ile aux Noix, and carefully described how they should have been
erected for maximum effectiveness.
Through it all, Bernhard comes
across as an exceptionally knowledgeable man, deeply interested in
the military arts and always alive
to the possibilities of improvement
or greater efficiencies. A keen observer, he recorded detailed accounts of his impressions of the
people he met (his comments on
natives an African-Americans are
particularly interesting), making
this book a fascinating read on a
variety of different levels.
AF
*****

5
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Fred L. Edwards, Jr., The Bridges
of Vietnam: From the Journals of
a U.S. Marine Intelligence Officer
(Denton: University of North Texas
Press, 2000), $39.95 US, 288 pages,
ISBN 1-57441-123-3.

Mark Moss, Manliness and Militarism: Educating Young Boys in
Ontario for War (Don Mills: Oxford
University Press, 2001), $24.95
paper, 216 pages, ISBN 0-19541594-9.

T

D

his book begins with the statement that there is an
unbridgeable gulf between the combat veteran and the soldier who has
not seen combat. Edwards, who
enlisted in the U.S. Marine Corps
as a seventeen year old in 1949,
found himself on the wrong side of
that gap. He tried desperately to get
himself reassigned to combat duty
during the Korean War, but was
constantly rebuffed. In 1961 he tried
again to get into action with the
Marines in Vietnam, but was again
stonewalled. Finally, in 1966, he
bridged the gulf by getting to the
lines in Vietnam as an intelligence
officer; at last, Edwards thought,
he was doing his job.
The core of this book are the
journals that Edwards sent home
to his wife to keep her informed of
his experiences. He has added explanatory endnotes to clarify certain references, and has included
some contextual paragraphs to provide background to the events he
describes, or to tie up any loose
ends in the story. These are very
useful additions because Edwards
had to be somewhat circumspect
about the events he described. He
was able, however, to sketch some
very vivid portraits of the soldiers
he met in Vietnam, both the good
and the bad (there are some interesting anecdotes about corruption
in the American supply lines). And
his reflections on the war are particularly useful. He learned “that national interest could be turned on
and off like a faucet” and that “donning leaves, eagles or stars does not
automatically confer a minimum
level of knowledge and integrity
upon an officer.” More importantly,
he accepted that it was “the duty of
the living to give meaning to the
dead.” This, for Edwards, was the
most vital lesson to be learned in
crossing his bridges in Vietnam.
DAR
*****
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uty, patriotism, peer pressure,
boredom, and unemployment
are several of the factors used to
explain the apparent enthusiasm
that young men felt for war in August 1914 and their subsequent rush
to the colours Another factor, and
perhaps the most important in Ontario, argues Mark Moss, was a pervasive “cult of manliness.” Young
boys, Moss maintains, were educated and conditioned to regard
war as an exciting adventure and
the supreme test of manhood. This
attitude was fostered and encouraged by governments and educators
anxious to counter the degenerative
effects of urbanization and industrialization. Drill became part of a
curriculum that was infused with
imperialism and militarism. Sports
provided appropriate role models
because they promoted the ideals
of toughness, courage and, above
all, obedience. The popularity of the
works of Kipling and G.A. Henty
was matched by that of magazines
like Boys Own Paper and Chums
which emphasized military and
masculine virtues. Scouting, hunting, cadet movements, and a host
of martial toys and games also
served to reinforce these values.
Thus when war came, it was eagerly
embraced by young men raised to
believe in its romance and adventure; they enlisted by the thousands. Nearly half of all volunteers
for the Canadian Expeditionary
Force hailed from Ontario.
Moss’s findings for Ontario
are, however, at odds with some
recent European scholarship. Niall
Fergusson and Jeffrey Verhey have
challenged the myth of widespread
enthusiasm for war in 1914, pointing out that the initial reaction in
Britain and Germany was more
mixed than previously assumed.
Moss’s conclusion that “most aspects of young men’s lives were orientated towards the military” also
seems a bit of an overstatement.

Equally puzzling is his casual dismissal of pre-war pacifism and
peace movements as hopelessly
overwhelmed and ineffective in the
wake of a powerful middle-class
militarist discourse. Despite this,
Moss offers a compelling and wellwritten account of the intellectual
and cultural climate in which young
boys in Ontario were raised prior
to the First World War.
WG
*****
Gunther E. Rothenberg, The Army
of Francis Joseph (West Lafayette,
IN: Purdue University Press [distributed in Canada by Scholarly
Book Services], 1998), $24.95 US,
298 pages, ISBN 1-55753-146-3.

T

he title sets the tone. Franz
Josef became emperor through
the action of the army after the ruling emperor Ferdinand resigned
during the 1848 revolution, and
henceforward identified himself
with the army. Likewise, the army
identified itself with the dynasty,
becoming the only institution holding the multi-national empire together. When Franz Josef died in
the middle of the First World War,
the army and the empire lost their
raisons d’etre.
The empire was shaped by, and
suffered from, the Habsburg tradition of accumulating territories
willy-nilly through marriage, treaty,
and occasionally war. After Napoleon, such dynastic conglomerations fell victim to the strains of
nationalism, while Austria’s uneven
economic development hindered
the modernization of the army in
weaponry, strategy, tactics, and logistics. One early result was that
Prussia, later Germany, pushed
them all over the map. So did everyone else.
War in Italy started the decline.
Austria lost significant territory
and prestige in 1859, and even
more in 1866 when Bismarck
kicked them out of his Germany.
Each time the army tried to question what had gone wrong, but the
structure of the army was tied
firmly to the “structure” of the empire, and Franz Josef was afraid of
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structure (past attempts to create a
strong central state had failed, and
the only alternative was to build a
nation state, but which nation?). So,
the only result of defeat was
scapegoating: 135 generals
cashiered after Solferino, more after Koniggratz.
After 1871 the fate of Austria
lay in the Balkans, yet that region
was now the hotbed of nationalism
in Europe. The newly acquired
(1878) and annexed (1908) province
of Bosnia became the focus of tension between Austria and the Balkan States, which demonstrated
their military effectiveness in the
two Balkan Wars of 1912-13. In turn
the Balkan hostilities got caught up
in the alliance rivalries of all the
Great Powers. For Austria the external problems were compounded
by internal nationality crises with
the Czechs and the Hungarians (seldom has an imperial army comprised so many peoples). Yet the
imperial and royal (K und K) army
remained functional and loyal until the very end of the war.
The First World War did not
go well for Austria; they were defeated at the outset by Serbia. Concern for its own internal unity and
security led Austria to defer initiative on the Eastern Front to a better trained and equipped German
army which, however, pursued a
German strategy. As the war
dragged on the only thing holding
the empire together was fondness
for Franz Josef. Everyone had
grown up with the emperor, and his
grandfatherly qualities mitigated his
government’s policies. Even after
his death in 1916 the momentum
of loyalty continued until the situation became hopeless. But the army
was not actually defeated; it simply
began to fragment into national
units, like the empire itself.
The imperial army raised 8
million soldiers for the war; 1 million died in action, 2 million were
wounded, and 1.7 million were
taken prisoner, of whom one-third
died in captivity. When emperor
Charles finally agreed to leave Vienna in November 1918 he forgot
to say goodbye to his army – a fitting faux pas for a Habsburg, and

possibly a clue to what had gone
wrong for so long.
JW
*****
Richard Butler, The Greatest
Threat: Iraq, Weapons of Mass
Destruction, and the Crisis of
Global Security (New York:
PublicAffairs, 2000), $26.00 US,
304 pages, ISBN 1-89162-053-3.

B

utler is the experienced and respected Australian diplomat
who was appointed to head
UNSCOM and monitor possible
Iraqi violations in the areas of
chemical, biological, and nuclear
weapons. It is a fascinating story,
but also a textbook example of an
author being too close to the material.
Indeed, there is a comic-book
aura about The Greatest Threat
that, if the subject matter were not
so serious, would make it vaguely
amusing. It begins with a scenario
that is straight out of Hollywood:
terrorists (from the Middle East,
of course) with a lethal chemical
(carried in something like a small
Windex bottle) that they spray over
New York City at rush hour, sending thousands of people to a painful death. How would the United
States react? Would there be war?
Who
would
call
Arnold
Schwarzenegger? The rest of the
book proceeds in the same vein.
There are Good Guys and Bad
Guys, and everything is painted
starkly in black and white. The Iraqis are, of course, the Bad Guys,
and Butler quickly runs out of adjectives sufficient to describe the
depths of their evil. Saddam
Hussein remains in the shadows of
the narrative, so the lead Bad Guy
role goes to Tariq Aziz, who blusters and shouts and bullies and acts
in a generally objectionable fashion.
The Good Guys are Butler and his
team of inspectors who are frustrated at every turn in their attempts
to hold Iraq accountable – frustrated by some other Bad Guys,
Russia, France, and China, who are
so keen on trade, oil, and other
advantages that they sabotage all
efforts to cripple Iraq’s chemical
and biological weapons industries.
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Somewhere in the middle is Kofi
Annan (Misguided Guy?), whose
heart is basically in the right place
and who tries to do right, but is
ineffectual and too willing to defer
to the Iraqis for the sake of temporary peace.
All of this might well be true,
although I’m not convinced that the
sort of demonization Butler engages in is particularly helpful to
an understanding of the issues at
hand, or to finding a way around
them. We now know all too well that
the sort of terrorist act Butler describes is certainly possible. There
are important issues here, and Butler is probably right when he argues that the world needs to sit up,
take notice, and devote more attention to global survival than to their
own national interests.
LT
*****
Kathryn Spurling and Elizabeth
Greenhalgh, eds., Women in Uniform: Perceptions and Pathways
(Canberra: Australian Defence
Force Academy, 2000), $25.00 AUS
paper, 275 pages, ISBN 0-73170385-5

T

he conference “Women in Uniform: Perceptions and Pathways,” held at the Australian Defence Force Academy in May 199,
brought together academics, policy
makers, serving officers, and journalists to discuss and debate issues
surrounding the employment of
women in uniformed security roles,
both in the military and in other
services, such as intelligence agencies, the police, and the firefighting
forces. The conference was interdisciplinary and, more importantly, comparative, including papers on Canada, the United States,
Great Britain, South Africa, Namibia, and the NATO forces. Some
of the papers are not terribly probing and sound a little like press
releases (the Canadian contribution,
for example, concludes with the
promise that “the end of the tribunal period serves as a milestone for
a process [of gender integration in
the Canadian Forces] that is not yet
complete, but for which the Cana-
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he story of Irish internment is
surely one of the most curious
of the Second World War: German
and Allied pilots interned (the term
is used loosely, since the parole arrangements were very liberal) in
adjacent compounds, held for having transgressed on the republic’s
highly idiosyncratic neutrality laws.
RAF pilots who crashed on training missions were not generally interned, but those who landed in
Eire during operational flights were
(although the definition of what constituted a training mission became
rather more elastic as the war progressed). American crews, regardless of the kind of mission they
were flying, were not usually in-

terned, an indication of the importance of the United States in Irish
government policy. Irish opinion
about the internment policy was
mixed. Hatred of Britain ran deep,
and there was a certain amount of
sympathy for the Germans in nationalist quarters as well. But there
was also the wealthy and influential Anglo-Protestant upper classes
in Eire, who were pro-British and
did what they could to assist the
RAF internees to escape (despite the
fact that rendering such assistance
was an offence under Irish law). On
top of it all was Irish president
Eamon de Valera’s sobering realization that, if he maintained the internment policy, there was a chance
that he would one day have to imprison one of his own citizens, for
many thousands of Irishmen had
joined the RAF.
All of these threads enter into
the story of Ralph Keefer’s father,
the pilot of a Wellington that crashlanded in Eire after getting lost on
the way home from Frankfurt in
October 1941. His internment was
typical of the experience: clashes
with the guards over Irish neutrality, dances and picnics with locals,
fishing in the Liffey near the camp,
trips to Dublin, semi-comical attempts at escape. Keefer ultimately
made a successful escape in August
1942, but his pal Jack Calder (a
reporter who wrote about life in
Eire for various Canadian newspapers) had to resort to the rather less
romantic tactic of feigning insanity
to win his release. All of this makes
for hugely entertaining reading, and
Keefer tells of his father’s life in
internment with wit and panache.
He seems to have somehow partaken of Calder’s skill as a storyteller, for he is able to convey both
the joys and the miseries of a lessthan-challenging theatre of operations.
Unfortunately, the author has
been rather less well served by his
publisher, for the book is full of
typographical and other errors
which are irritating and disconcerting. Names of famous people are
spelled incorrectly, acronyms are
improperly translated, photographs
are misidentified (there is one
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dian Forces has a commitment to
finish”), but others are refreshingly
new and interesting. E.C. Ejiogu
provides a fascinating glimpse at the
women who served in combat roles
in the wars of national liberation in
South Africa and Namibia, an essay that should be read after Hugh
Smith’s useful thought-piece entitled
“Debating Women in Combat” and
Amanda Dines’ most interesting
article on physiological competencies for combat roles in the Australian Defence Force. Sarah Garcia
provides some illuminating statistics from 1998-99 on women’s participation in various NATO countries’ armies. Interestingly, the
United States led the way in this
regard, with women making up
14.4% of the total force. Canada
placed second at 10.8%, and bringing up the rear was Italy, which, at
the time the statistics were compiled, had not yet passed legislation enabling women to serve in the
armed forces. A bibliography or
reading list would have been a welcome addition to the book, but it
nevertheless serves as a valuable
source of information and opinion.
SL
*****
Ralph Keefer, Grounded in Eire:
The Story of Two RAF Fliers Interned in Ireland during World
War II (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s
University Press, 2001), $24.95,
268 pages, ISBN 0-7735-1142-3.

T

https://scholars.wlu.ca/cmh/vol11/iss3/9

which is identified as a Lougheed
Hudson, but it bears no resemblance to an actual Lockheed Hudson), and the names of characters
change (a Mrs. Maudlins at the top
of one page has become Mrs.
Mullens by the bottom). Grounded
in Eire is a wonderful story, but
one wishes that the press had
elected to have it proof-read.
JFV
*****
Dan Bessie, ed., Alvah Bessie’s
Spanish Civil War Notebooks
(Lexington: University Press of Kentucky [distributed in Canada by
Scholarly Book Services], 2002),
$36.25, 156 pages, ISBN 0-81312214-7.

O

ne of the best books to emerge
from the Spanish Civil War was
Men in Battle, by journalist and
blacklisted Hollywood screenwriter
Alvah Bessie. It is a searing account
of combat with the International
Brigades, those foreign volunteers
who flocked to Spain in 1936 and
1937 to fight fascism. With this volume, we get a chance to read the
real history behind that memoir.
Many memoirs from former
members of the International Brigades are characterized by high
idealism and principle; after all,
these were men who divined the
threat of fascism before most others and who defied their governments to fight for the republican
cause. Bessie paints a rather different picture of his comrades. His
notebooks cover the waning months
of the International Brigades’ existence, when foreigners were being
replaced by Spaniards and when
discussions were underway to disband the Brigades for political reasons. With their future in doubt, the
Brigades began to experience growing problems with discipline. His
comrades were not the idealistic,
committed volunteers that we would
expect, but tired, disgruntled, disillusioned soldiers who had long
since lost any interest in the struggle that they may once have had, and
only wanted to get home. There
were exceptions, obviously; Bessie
himself clearly retained a high de-
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gree of ideological commitment.
But many others did not, and the
picture we get is that the International Brigades had become mere
shadows of their former selves.
Once the elite fighting forces of the
republican armies, by the end they
were hobbled by desertions, insubordination, and indiscipline.
Aside from the journal entries,
there are a number of other interesting elements to this book: letters from Bessie’s ex-wife, raising
their two children in New York City;
constant rebukes of Bessie by the
Spanish censor, who was disturbed
by Bessie’s tendency to include
sketch maps of the front in his letters; and songs (some of them quite
bawdy) which were popular with
International Brigaders. This, then,
is a valuable record which offers a
useful corrective to the sometimes
hagiographic literature of the Spanish Civil War.
JFV
*****
Kathleen Kennedy, Disloyal Mothers and Scurrilous Citizens:
Women and Subversion During
World War I (Bloomington: Indiana
University Press, 1999), $27.95 US,
170 pages, ISBN 0-253-33565-5.
Supporters of American entry
into the First World War characterized their efforts as a battle to preserve freedom, while the government attempted to quash dissent at
home with the Espionage and Sedition Acts. Approximately twenty
of the 800 people convicted under
these Acts were women. Kathleen
Kennedy focuses on three of the
most famous, Katie Richards
O’Hare, Emma Goldman, and Rose
Pastor Stokes, as well as several
lesser known women targeted for
prosecution. These cases, she argues, demonstrate the relationship
between gender and subversion in
the wartime political culture.
Kennedy addresses the importance of patriotic motherhood in the
pro-war ideology, but her exclusive
focus on women charged under the
Acts, only two of whom were mothers, impedes her arguments. Undoubtedly there were mothers who
dissented against the war in acts

large and small but they are beyond
the focus of this work. Only a small
element of women’s subversive
behavior appears here. Kennedy
notes that protesters from some
women’s organizations were
charged under local rather than federal law but she does not address
why. What made one group of
women a threat to patriotic motherhood and not the other? Without
a continuum of dissent we lose sight
of how gender interacted with factors of class, ethnicity, and political affiliation in defining subversion. Kennedy points to some interesting links between the rhetoric of gender and radicalism, but
does not fully analyse how these
shaped the understanding of those
involved, and how they were
shaped by the context of the time.
In the trials Kennedy presents, and
in her own analysis, other issues
and conflicts seem to outweigh gender or maternal concerns. Ultimately this is more a case study of
the persecution of women on the
Left than a study of the relationship
between gender and subversion
during the First World War.
VLK
*****
David J. Bercuson, The Patricias:
The Proud History of a Fighting
Regiment (Toronto: Stoddart,
2001), $34.95, 347 pages, ISBN 07737-3298-5.

T

he PPCLI has been in the news
again recently because of its operations in Afghanistan, operations
that will necessitate the writing of
another chapter in the regimental
history. But for now, Bercuson’s
new history is an admirable addition to the growing historiography
on Canada’s most famous infantry
regiment. We have Ralph HodderWilliams two-volume chronicle of
the unit in the First World War and
G.R. Stevens’ history of the PPCLI
from 1919 to 1959. Jeffery
Williams has written a general history of the Princess Pats, as well as
a biography of Hamilton Gault, the
regiment’s founder. But Bercuson’s
is the first to take the story right
up to the UN peacekeeping opera-
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tions in Kosovo and the eighty-fifth
anniversary of the unit’s founding,
observed in Edmonton in 1999.
It is of necessity less detailed
than some of the earlier accounts,
but that does not mean that it is any
less satisfying. On the contrary,
Bercuson has done a fine job of
condensing the unit’s disparate engagements into a cohesive and immensely readable narrative. He
does not shy away from some of
the more controversial episodes in
the historical record, such as the
difficulties over changes in command towards the end of the First
World War, when Hamilton Gault’s
wishes clashed with those of officers who had spent more time in
action with the unit. There is also
an excellent survey of the unit’s
stints in Cyprus, one of the longest
and most difficult of UN peacekeeping missions. But the bulk of the
chapters focus on the Patricias’ operations during the First and Second World War, when the unit won
the majority of the battle honours
that now adorn its standard, known
affectionately as the Ric-a-DamDoo. It was during those engagements that the PPCLI sustained
most of its fatal casualties (which
are listed in an honour roll at the
back of the book). The book itself
is dedicated to Hamilton Gault, but
the fallen are also central to the
regimental memory, and to this excellent history.
CA
*****
Robert P. Grathwol and Donita M.
Moorhus, Berlin and the American Military: A Cold War Chronicle (New York: New York University Press, 1999), $50.00 US, 200
pages, ISBN 0-8147-3133-3

T

he US Mission remained in
Berlin from 1945 to 1994.
From the very beginning US soldiers
mingled with the people – at first
out of necessity, later out of Cold
War cooperation, and eventually out
of mutual respect. Soldiers and
conquered civilians alike helped
clean up the mountains of rubble
after the war (literally mountains:
the ruins of Berlin created a hill
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high enough to mount el-int detection equipment that scanned all the
way to Moscow. Today the
Teufelsberg makes a nice ski
park.).
In the early postwar years the
Americans found it easier to deal
with Berliners than with their supposed “Allies.” This special relationship intensified after the Berlin
Blockade as local residents
worked side by side with Americans to keep the airlift running
smoothly. (Tensions were so high
that Bob Hope had to visit the
troops at Christmas.) Once the Cold
War set in, American military personnel who crossed into the Russian Zone for espionage took their
lives in their hands; several never
made it back alive.
The US persuaded West Germany to contribute some of its
Marshall Plan funds to West Berlin, which started the policy of making West Berlin the showplace of
capitalism face to face with the showplace of communism. The result was
an exodus of East Germans to the
West until East Germany cut the
border with West Germany in 1952,
and the border with West Berlin in
1961 – with no US opposition
(something the Berliners had trouble understanding: it stemmed from
the fact that the US Mission was
there to defend the rights of the
United States as an ally with a stake
in the fate of Berlin and Germany,
and not to protect either West Berlin or West Germany).
Willy Brandt’s series of treaties in the early 1970s eased relations between the two Germanies
and the two Berlins, but the rush
towards reunification in 1989-90
caught everyone off guard – so
much so that during the hardline
soviet coup against Gorbachev a
number of Berliners called the US
Mission “just to be sure you Americans are still here.” But the inevitable result of reunification was the
withdrawal of the Mission in 1994.
Four years later the reunited city
of Berlin, capital of a reunited Germany, dedicated the Allied Museum
on Clayallee, named after General
Lucius Clay, first US military governor in postwar Germany. Clay was
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so well regarded in Berlin and
Germany that President Kennedy
sent him back to Berlin during the
crisis over the Wall to reassure
Germans that the US would not
abandon them (although that was an
option under consideration –
briefly – in Washington).
Although written by two historians, this book originated in the
“Cold War Project” of the Resource
Management Program of the US
Department of Defense. This is an
engaging retrospective account of
the US military mission in Berlin
that illuminates some hidden corners of Cold War Europe. It is heavily illustrated, and features oral
history reminiscences by Berliners
and Americans that testify to the
“special relationship” that developed between the two sides during
a period that lasted longer than
anyone could have anticipated.
JW
*****
John Horne and Alan Kramer, German Atrocities, 1914: A History
of Denial (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2001), $40.00 US, 608
pages, ISBN 0-300-08975-9.

I

n the early years of the First
World War, Allied propagandists
had a field day with stories of war
crimes committed against French
and Belgian civilians by invading
German units. In short order, these
stories became the centrepiece of
the Allied justification for the war;
in everything from recruiting posters to church sermons, it was argued that the Kaiser’s armies had
to be stopped, or they would carry
their campaign of murder, looting,
and rapine to every other country
in the world. The vigour with which
propagandists took up these tales
has long convinced historians to
take them with a grain of salt; it
was assumed that a few minor incidents had been blown out of proportion as part of the campaign of
misinformation directed at a credulous public.
As Horne and Kramer demonstrate in this fascinating and persuasive book, nothing could be further from the truth. With rigorous

and impeccable scholarship (they
have consulted every conceivable
primary source, from victim testimonies to the diaries of German
soldiers involved in the operations,
to shed light on the German campaign against the civilian population
in France and Belgium in 1914),
they conclude that the Allied propagandists were in fact right, in the
main. The story of French and Belgian children having their hands
hacked off by invading soldiers
might have been a myth, but atrocities committed against civilians in
the path of the German offensive
were widespread and systematic.
There were summary executions (all
told, over 6000 civilians were
killed by invading units), rapes,
arson (Catholic churches and their
clergy were particularly targetted),
pillage, mass deportations, torture,
and instances of civilians being used
as human shields – in short, virtually everything that had long been
dismissed as inventions of Allied
propagandists. The authors attribute this campaign of terror to a
strange case of mass delusion in
which the invading armies were
swept by waves of paranoia about
resistance by francs-tireurs. The
German army became obsessed
with the thought that French and
Belgian civilians were all guerilla
fighters who were sniping at German soldiers from church towers
and homes. It was a powerful phobia that ran through German units
like some kind of disease, but in
fact Horne and Kramer conclude
that there were very few instances
of the civilian population taking up
arms against the invaders. On the
contrary, when minor fire-fights
began in the newly occupied areas,
they could almost always be traced
to panicky German troops firing on
each other. In most such cases, it
was civilians who were blamed, and
who were made to pay with their
lives.
German Atrocities, 1914 is
sure to cause a controversy, particularly among historians who argue that Allied protestations of coming to the aid of defenceless civilians were just a blind to divert attention from their own nefarious
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war aims. But it is difficult to find
any holes in Horne and Kramer’s
analysis. The book is a model of
scholarship, and should put to rest
the notion that the German armies
which descended on Belgium and
France in August 1914 were paragons of virtue.
JFV
*****
N.G.L. Hammond, The Genius of
Alexander the Great (Chapel Hill:
University of North Carolina Press
[distributed in Canada by Scholarly
Book Services], 1997), $49.50, 220
pages, ISBN 0-8078-4744-5.

T

he city states of classical
Greece were much like the nation states of Modern Europe – always fighting for (or against) a precarious balance of power; always
prey to powerful land-based empires like Persia and Rome. Not
surprisingly Plato spoke for many
Greeks who longed for a lasting
peace, while Isocrates found the
saviour in the form of Philip of
Macedon, Alexander’s father.
By the time Philip became king
in 357 BCE, Macedonia had pulled
itself together thanks to a well-oiled
military machine based on heavily
armed infantry formations and professional cavalry. He contributed his
own statesmanship to the equation:
as he conquered state after state he
offered them all equal citizenship
with Macedonians. Alexander
would extend this generous policy
across half of Asia.
After the assassination of
Philip, young Alexander was elected
king and continued his father’s
plans to gain control of the AegeanBlack Sea-Western Mediterranean
region, uniting the area of Greek
influence (while extending that influence through the founding of new
cities like Alexandria), and denying ports to the Persian navy. He then
headed east, to fight it out with
Darius for control of Asia. In rapid
succession Alexander conquered
the fabulously rich province of
Babylonia, then Persia itself. From
there he pressed north, into Afghanistan and Central Asia.

By this time Alexander, continuing his practice of accepting all
peoples who surrendered into his
new Kingdom of Asia, started acting like an oriental king himself,
basking in the riches of his new
empire. All of this was a departure
from Macedonian tradition and his
troops grew restive at the changes
in behaviour. Yet Alexander continued to act like a Greek ruler among
his Greek soldiers. When his men
refused to follow him on a “quick”
campaign against India, he gracefully accepted the auguries of a sacrifice and headed back west with
his army. They all agreed on an attack against Arabia, the last outpost
in western Asia not under his control. But before he could strike he
fell victim to malaria at the age of
thirty-two.
Hammond’s book is based on
a careful reading of ancient texts.
Unfortunately it reads like an ancient text – a literal statement of the
facts about the battles: the preparations, the marching, the flanking,
the fighting, and the peacemaking.
There is no sense of adventure, no
excitement, no grandeur – nothing
to help the reader understand why
another successful conqueror,
Julius Caesar, wept at his own lack
of accomplishment at age thirty,
when Alexander had conquered the
world and was preparing for still
more campaigns.
JW
*****
Robert Irwin, Good God, How
Gorgeous! (Toronto: Lugus Publications, 2001), $18.95 paper, 460
pages, ISBN 1-896266-94-0.
John A. Marin, My Army Days: A
Soldier’s Memoir (Privately published [available from the author at
P.O. Box 97, Cardinal, ON, KOE
1EO], 2000), 130 pages, ISBN 09686875-0-4.

T

hese two memoirs give us very
different perspectives on the
Second World War, from a tank officer and an infantry rider. Irwin
was an officer with the GovernorGeneral’s Horse Guards who
served with the unit throughout the
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Italian campaign (with the exception
of a spell away from the front after
he was wounded in action on the
Gothic Line) and also went with the
Guards to the Netherlands in 1945.
Marin was a ranker, posted to the
Queen’s Own Rifles after the invasion of Normandy to serve as the
despatch rider attached to the well
known Captain Ben Dunkelman. He
remained with the QOR throughout
the campaign in north-west Europe,
leaving the Netherlands in November 1945 to return to Canada.
Both authors provide useful
and interesting insights into the
campaigns in which they participated. From Marin, we learn about
the actions of the QOR from the
point of view of someone whose job
was to do something other than to
carry a rifle. He took part in most
of the regiment’s engagements after early August 1944, and was acquainted with many of the unit’s
more well known members, including Charlie Martin, whose recollections of the campaign were published some years ago. Irwin’s book
is useful because there are so few
accounts written by tankers who
served in Italy or north-west Europe. Aside from the descriptions
of the actions of his own troop, he
has much to say (not all of it flattering) about the officers of other
tank regiments which fought alongside the GGHG. These reflections
will be particularly interesting to
readers who are familiar with the
personalities of the Italian campaign.
It is worth mentioning that
both books (Irwin’s much more than
Marin’s) are characterized by a
marked preoccupation with the
sexual exploits of their authors. As
enjoyable as these incidents must
have been to participate in, they are
not particularly interesting to the
general reader. The first description of an opportunistic sexual encounter is amusing; the tenth, fifteenth, and twentieth are tiresome
and tedious. Still, if you can wade
through these passages, both of
these books have much to recommend them.
DAR
*****
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Richard Holmes, The Western
Front: Ordinary Soldiers and the
Defining Battles of World War
One (New York: TV Books, 2000)
$26.00 US, 224 pages, ISBN157500-147-0.

T

his companion to the BBC documentary of the same name
stands alone as an excellent onevolume history of Western Front.
Readers seeking to learn more
about other fronts and the naval war
should look elsewhere, but Holmes
has produced a first-rate study of
the west.
The book begins with a superb
examination of the revolution in
military affairs that preceded events
of August 1914. Here Holmes sides
with those of us who have always
been skeptical of the claim that no
one knew what to expect when war
erupted in the late summer of 1914.
It seems incredible that generals
schooled in shadow of the American Civil War and the Russo-Japanese war could not have known that
frontal attacks on fortified positions
would reap horrendous casualties.
Holmes says that most of the planners did predict very heavy casualties and even a period of stalemate
in trenches, but that they deluded
themselves into believing that they
could nonetheless defeat their enemy through sheer force of will.
They believed that the courage and
national character of their troops
would carry the day, as it apparently had for the Japanese when
they defeated the Russians. The
endless casualty lists of the Western Front were viewed as a mark
of national resolve and a nation’s
fitness to be a great power rather
than catastrophes.
Holmes gives a surprisingly
balanced appraisal of the men who
orchestrated these disasters. While
agreeing that very few of the senior
British and French generals were
likeable characters, he acknowledges that they faced a military
problem of staggering complexity:
an entrenched army could not move,
but an unentrenched army could not
survive. What is surprising, in the
author’s view, is how many victories the more seasoned HQs of 1917
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and 1918 were able to plan against
a foe as determined and tactically
proficient as the German army.
Military histories of the First
World War tend to fall into the
same grisly patterns that the battles themselves did, but Holmes
renews our interest in these battles
by skillfully weaving together the
most recent scholarship on command-level decisions with first-person accounts of infantrymen on the
front lines. Accounts of war through
the eyes of ordinary men are all the
rage these days, but seldom are
they so effectively coordinated with
an analysis of strategic-level decision making.
The book is well illustrated with
rare photographs and many excellent maps. My only quibble is with
the lack of any accompanying documentation. As the sophistication of
popular military histories increases
and their debt on scholarly sources
grows, surely it is time for popular
authors and their publishers to
start to acknowledge those debts
properly.
GB
*****
Paul A. Shackel, ed., Myth,
Memory and the Making of the
American Landscape (Gainesville:
University Press of Florida [distributed in Canada by Scholarly Book
Services], 2001), $104.95, 286
pages, ISBN 0-8130-2104-9.

T

his fascinating collection sheds
light on the contested nature of
memory with respect to military
sites, and the degree to which commemoration can become highly politicized. The US Civil War looms
large in the American consciousness, and over certain parts of the
American landscape, and so it is
hardly surprising that a number of
the essays deal with that conflict.
For example, Erika Martin Seibert
argues that the Manassas Battlefield
Park in Virginia enshrines a version of the two battles which occurred there that largely excises the
involvement of African-Americans.
Martha Temkin examines a similar
process at work in the struggle to
maintain the Antietam National Battlefield Park, while editor Shackel

looks at the memorial to Robert
Gould Shaw, who led the AfricanAmerican 54th Massachusetts Volunteers. Laurie Burgess’ essay on
Arlington National Cemetery is also
instructive, in part because
Arlington has become the symbolic
heart of military commemoration
in the United States. As other essays reveal, similar forces have influenced the commemoration of
other wars. Janice Dubel documents the process of creating
Manzanar National Historic Site,
which commemorates the internment of Japanese nationals and
Japanese Americans during the
Second World War, and Gail
Brown does the same for the Battle of Wounded Knee. And for those
readers interested in baseball,
there is an illuminating essay on the
contested history behind Baltimore’s Camden Yards.
LT
*****
Colonel R.D. Camp with Eric
Hammel, Lima-6: A Marine Company Commander in Vietnam
(Pacifica, CA: Pacifica Military History, 1999), $19.95 US paper, 295
pages, ISBN 0-935553-36-3.

T

his superb memoir about the
ground war in Vietnam details
Richard Camp’s eight-month experience leading Lima Company of the
3rd Battalion, 26th Marines, between
June of 1967 and January of 1968.
During this period, the author led
his company on operations throughout I Corps, the northern military
sector of South Vietnam. As Camp
and his men discovered, the region
was a beehive of activity as the Communists prepared for the coming
Tet Offensive and the siege of Khe
Sanh.
Similar to other Vietnam War
military biographies, Camp structures his book chronologically.
Upon arrival in June 1967, he spent
the first half of his tour leading
Lima Company. Following a short
leave, he returned to finish his work
with Lima before being appointed
Assistant Battalion Operations Officer, and later, a general’s aide. The
book, however, centers on Camp’s
time leading soldiers, offering just
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brief mentions of his staff assignments.
Camp is at his best detailing life
for a Marine Company operating in
and around the Khe Sanh area before and during the 1968 Tet Offensive. The author leads readers
down steep jungle valleys for nervewracking searches of empty, but
newly constructed, North Vietnamese bunkers. The strain of patrolling through the harsh Annam
Mountain weather is particularly
well covered. In addition, Camp
serves up a great deal of action. The
book explains the complexities of
patrolling, ambushes, and Marine
camp culture without losing the
narrative’s momentum. Interestingly, Camp shows a great deal of
respect for the North Vietnamese,
while showing little regard for their
Southern cousins. Throughout, the
author spices the story with anecdotes ranging from the grotesque
to the humorous, and always with
an honesty the reader comes to respect.
Its unfortunate that Camp chose
not to detail the last months of his
tour spent as a general’s aide. A
macro view of the post-Tet fighting,
and his personal political views of
the war, would have nicely rounded
out his foxhole level account. Still,
this career officer has produced a
lively memoir of his time leading a
Marine infantry company, and as
such, offers a useful contribution
to the combat literature of the Vietnam War.
BC
*****
Gil Murray, The Invisible War: The
Untold Secret Story of Number
One Canadian Special Wireless
Group, Royal Canadian Signal
Corps, 1944-1946 (Toronto:
Dundurn Press, 2001), $24.99 paper,
302 pages, ISBN 1-55002-371-3.

G

il Murray’s memoir of Number
One Canadian Special Wireless
Group of the Royal Canadian Signal Corps (1CSWG) describes the
career of the only complete Canadian signals unit sent to the war in
the Pacific. Because the thirty-year
secrecy ban had long been lifted on

the 1CSWG, Murray was perplexed
as to why historians had not uncovered what he believes was the unit’s
vitally important role in winning the
Pacific campaign.
As a teenager working at a local St. Catharines, Ontario, radio
station, Murray enlisted in the infantry, only to be asked later to
volunteer for a top-secret mission
in the Pacific. Unaware of his future role in the army, Murray accepted the mission to find upon
arriving at a shabby training base
in the thick forests on the northern
part of Vancouver Island’s Saanich
Peninsula that he had volunteered
for 1CSWG. The majority of
Murray’s book evolves around the
daily activities and life in 1CSWG,
and his recollections of life in Canada’s only signals unit sent to the
south-west Pacific provide a truly
unique and personal account. The
unit’s career was an adventurous
one to say the least. Murray’s lively
account is dominated by drunkenness, prostitutes, late nights in the
red light districts of Vancouver and
San Francisco, life in unsanitary
living conditions, and more drunkenness. There are, however, scattered insights on such topics as
relations among the Allied troops,
divisions within the signals unit,
military discipline, regional identities in Canada, further reasons
why innocent Japanese were forced
into internment camps, and a reiteration of the defence for the use
of the atomic bomb on Japan.
Once his unit arrived at its base
near Darwin, Australia, Murray has
surprisingly little to say about the
role it played in intercepting and
decoding Japanese radio communications. While there are short
descriptions of instances where the
1CSWG undoubtedly performed a
crucial role in aiding the Allies operations, Murray did not satisfy
this reviewer’s curiosity. He does,
however, provide the reader with
insight into the essential workings
of 1CSWG and its place in operation “Magic.” More importantly,
Murray not only identifies a weakness in Canadian military
historiography, but he also pro-
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vides an invaluable starting point
for addressing this weakness.
SBW
*****
Antulio J. Echevarria II, After
Clausewitz: German Military
Thinkers Before The Great War
(Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2000), $39.95 US, 346 pages,
ISBN 0-7006-1071-5.

W

hen one thinks of pre-1914
military thought, blind adherence to the “cult of the offensive”
leaps to the fore. However, as the
director of national security studies at the U.S. Army War College,
Lieutenant-Colonel
Antulio
Echevarria argues, this view is coloured by the horrific slaughter of
the First World War, which has led
many historians to hastily and unfairly condemn prewar military
thought as simplistic and misguided. Through a detailed discussion of the published writings of
prominent German military theorists of the period 1870-1914, such
as von Bernhardi, von der Goltz,
and the civilian historian Hans
Delbruck, Echevarria contends that
fin-de-siècle military thought addressed and solved the tactical,
strategic, and cultural crises in
warfare of the era. These crises,
spawned by technological innovations such as the breech-loading
rifle, the belt-fed machine gun, and
longer ranged field artillery, shifted
the balance in favour of the defender
and made a Napoleonic decisive
victory increasingly improbable.
Adding to the dilemma was the apparent decline in health and moral
quality of the average soldier due,
as many believed, to the pernicious
influence of technology and urbanization.
German military thinkers,
along with their counterparts
throughout the Western world,
sought to locate a means of returning manoeuvre to warfare with the
hopes of achieving decisive victory
in the next general war. Their solution, as developed through close
study of the Boer and Russo-Japanese Wars, was to emphasize fire
and movement with combined arms
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and decentralized execution of operations to cope with the increased
tempo of operations. Yet, as
Echevarria concedes, these two
objectives were in opposition to
each other, a dilemma resolved only
by a doctrinal shift to an increased
emphasis on individual judgement
and initiative by junior officers. It
is here and not with the body of
military thought that Echevarria
locates the root of the strategic and
tactical paralysis and resulting
slaughter of the armies of the First
World War. The theorists did their
part, he asserts, by addressing the
fin-de-siècle crisis of warfare; the
events of the Great War were the
result of incomplete training and a
pervasive anti- intellectualism
among junior officers which led
them to ignore the doctrinal solutions and instead rely upon the
more dashing “spirit of the offensive.” Although this is a novel explanation of the failures of First
World War strategy and prewar
doctrines, Echevarria does not
prove that junior officers wilfully
ignored the works of military
thinkers, leaving his conclusion at
the level of hypothesis. Given the
detail in which he describes the
various theoretical perspectives, it
is odd that the point which would
complete his rehabilitation of prewar German military thought would
be dealt with briefly and vaguely in
under four pages. That being said,
Echevarria s book is a useful synthesis of the German contribution
to a largely neglected and misunderstood era of military thought.
DR

elinda Davis’ Home Fires Burning is a unique addition to the
growing literature on the effects of
war on the home front. Davis uses
a gendered analysis to explore the

civilian war experience on a local
level, namely the female-led battle
over food in wartime Berlin. Using
police and military reports on civilian morale in conjunction with
contemporary public and private
documents, Davis examines the increasingly severe impact of the
British blockade on the availability of food for Berliners while also
attempting to provide a fresh perspective on the nature of politics
and class relations. She argues that
the experience of economic warfare
in Berlin created a temporary solidarity among the working and
lower-middle classes on the basis
of their common experience as deprived consumers. At the core of
this confluence of interests was the
symbolic rallying point of “women
of lesser means” whose increased
militancy during the war served as
a socially acceptable means of expressing discontent and common
demands on the state for intervention in the provision of food.
From initial opposition to perceived profiteering and favouritism
in the distribution of food, the discontent of Berliners increased as
the blockade tightened, escalating
to street protests and bread riots
by 1916. Davis believes that the
Imperial Government did not crack
down on these protests due to their
gendered nature, although their attempts to placate the women of
lesser means with a variety of illconceived policies led only to a
wholesale rejection of the state by
early 1918, thereby opening the way
for revolution. This is the weakest
element of Davis’ analysis as she
overstates the role played by the
internal “food war” in the collapse
of the German Empire in November 1918. In part, this is the result
of her case-study approach, which
does not permit a broader discussion of factors such as national warweariness or military factors such
as the American entry into the war
and the plummeting morale of the
German Navy by 1918 as contributors to the collapse.
Of greater concern is that the
women of lesser means and indeed
the working classes generally lack
a voice in Davis’ narrative. By rely-
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*****
Belinda J. Davis, Home Fires
Burning: Food, Politics, and Everyday Life in World War I Berlin
(Chapel Hill: University of North
Carolina Press [distributed in
Canada by Scholarly Book Services], 2000), $90.75, 349 pages,
ISBN 0-8078-2526-3.
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ing upon police reports, Davis
presents a male, lower-middle class
view of the food war. Although she
provides evidence that as the blockade took hold many officers began
to identify with the concerns expressed by the working classes, the
women of lesser means appear as a
faceless, voiceless mass who appear
to be acted upon by others instead
of assuming the role of leadership
which Davis ascribes to them. Indeed, Davis’ conclusion that the
food war created popular expectations which not only contributed to
the downfall of the Kaiser but also
shaped the Weimar Republic (for
better or worse) is difficult to
prove, particularly when the working class’ own political goals remain
unclear. This is a common problem faced by social historians which
weakens Davis’ argument. Overall,
however, Home Fires Burning is a
thought-provoking consideration of
women and class in wartime.
DR
*****
G.R.T. (Bob) Willis, No Hero, Just
a Survivor (privately published
[available from the author at 19
Rectory Lane, Emley, Huddersfield, HD8 9RR, England], 1999),
£18.00, 318 pages, ISBN 0-9537178-0-1.

T

he title of Bob Willis’ fine, understated book reflects how
many of those who served at the
sharp end of the Second World War
felt after it ended. Willis piloted
Beaufighters and Mosquitos (his
spelling) with 47 Squadron in the
Mediterranean and Burma between
1943 and 1945. He and his navigator Tommy Thompson survived
through skill, experience, and luck.
Willis missed death half a dozen
times, but writes about his operations in modest, undramatic terms.
The book combines his personal
story with a history of 47 Squadron – Raymond Collishaw commanded it during the civil war in
southern Russia in 1919, and other
Canadians served in the squadron
as well. Now based at Lyneham in
Wiltshire, 47 Squadron flies C130s
in a transport support role.
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Willis, a Yorkshireman, tells
his tale in plain, simple language
with occasional wry asides concerning Goolie Chits, the problems with
Mosquitos in tropical climates, and
the perils of flying planes during
the monsoon. After training in Rhodesia, Willis flew from Gambut, in
Libya, shooting up anything that
moved in the eastern Mediterranean. Transferred to India, he provided support for the 14th Army as
it advanced through Burma where
he was also stationed. Willis reflects on the fate of civilians caught
in these attacks and shows his appreciation for the ground crews that
kept the planes in the air. The writer
appears to have almost total recall
of his time in the services, and particularly remembers people like
Flight Lieutenant Al Scott, a Canadian and “probably the most skilful pilot on the squadron,” who was
hit by small arms fire while strafing Toungoo airfield in Burma –
Scottie and his navigator bailed
out, but the Canadian died from
loss of blood – and Wing Commander H.D.L. Filson-Young, CO of
47 Squadron, who went on “one
‘Op’ too many” and crashed after
surviving 232 sorties.
One great value of this book lies
in its very detailed account of what
life and air combat were like in forgotten theatres of war. Willis
“clocked up 274 hours in 64 sorties,” earning a well-deserved DFC.
A friend in the squadron wrote that
“47 was pretty clued up and all in
all did a good job.” The same can
be said of Bob Willis and his book.
JL
*****
George Davies, The Occupation of
Japan: The Rhetoric and the
Reality of Anglo-Australian Relations, 1939-1952 (St. Lucia: University of Queensland Press [distributed in North America by International Specialized Book Services], 2001), $31.95 US paper, 391
pages, ISBN 0-7022-3209-2.

T

he dominant Western memory
of the post-1945 occupation of
Japan is that of American dominance with General MacArthur and

his forces of occupation remaking
a malleable Japan in the image of
the United States, both culturally
and politically. However, as George
Davies argues, such a picture neglects the modest yet significant
contribution of the British Commonwealth Occupation Force
[BCOF], “a military force sent on a
political errand,” to the reconstruction and refashioning of Japan.
Despite the lack of a military role
and the predominance of the United
States, Davies believes the significance of the BCOF rests upon its
long-term impact upon considerations of politics, security, trade, and
relations with the Commonwealth
and with Japan.
Davies, who served as a dentist in the New Zealand contribution to the BCOF (and retired as
Vice-chancellor of the University of
Queensland), traces the full history
of the Force, from its roots in the
Second World War contributions of
Australia and New Zealand and
their desire to be treated as ‘parties principal’ by the Great Powers
in the making of the peace with Japan, to the BCOF s formation, composition, and mission in Southern
Honshu and Shikoku. As well, he
explores the Force’s public image
in Japan and in the Commonwealth
and its slow disintegration during
the late 1940s as a result of political squabbling among the contributing partners. Davies believes that
the BCOF suffered from a series of
ultimately intractable problems
which hindered its effectiveness
and contributed in large part to its
relegation to the dustbin of history.
These ranged from the high-level
rivalry between Australia and Great
Britain for control of the BCOF to
tactical considerations such as the
ill-conceived policy of no fraternization which limited the force’s influence with the Japanese civilian
population and contributed to serious morale-related issues such as
the widely publicized VD problem
in the force which irreparably tarnished the BCOF’s image on the
home fronts of the contributing
Commonwealth nations and in Japan.
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Davies’ narrative is well-supported (often too well) with evidence
gathered from careful consideration
of archival sources. Indeed, Davies
is at his best in his detailed discussions of the composition and
mission of the BCOF. However, the
first third of the book is devoted
to a lengthy discussion of the diplomatic and military histories of
Australia and New Zealand during
the Second World War based largely
upon secondary sources and thus
revisiting well-trod ground. Davies
asserts that he rewrote his draft
upon the appearance of Laurie
Brocklebank’s Jayforce: New Zealand and the Military Occupation
of Japan (1997) and James Wood’s
The Forgotten Force: the Australian Military Contribution to the
Occupation of Japan 1945-1952
but one wonders why he chose to
leave this largely extraneous contextual component intact. This is
even more confusing given that
Davies seems to be very reluctant
to include any autobiographical elements in his discussion which not
only would have enlivened the text
but would have also provided a valuable nuance to his argument.
DR
*****
Mark Connelly, Reaching For the
Stars: A New History of Bomber
Command in World War II (London: I.B. Tauris, 2001), $70.00 US,
206 pages, ISBN 1-86064-591-7.

T

he popular memory of the
Royal Air Force’s strategic
bombing campaign against Germany and the image of Bomber
Command’s wartime commander,
Air Marshal Arthur “Bomber”
Harris, remains highly controversial. Indeed, this was seen in
Canada and Britain in 1992 with the
storm of outrage which followed the
screening of the McKenna brothers’
portrayal of the campaign in their
three-part television documentary
The Valour and the Horror. Mark
Connelly, Reuters Lecturer in Media and Propaganda History at the
University of Kent and the author
of Christmas – A Social History,
embarked on an ambitious project
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with his new history of Bomber
Command viewed through the revisionist prism of myth, memory,
and meaning. Connelly seeks to
understand what the British people were told during the war about
Bomber Command’s efforts and
what beliefs they have developed
since. He argues that this collective
memory of Bomber Command is
confused, having been partly forged
during the first half of the war when
the government could not decide
what to tell the public and when
Bomber Command searched desperately for a mission it could actually accomplish within the limits
of contemporary technology.
Using a mix of historiography
and narrative, Connelly traces the
history of Bomber Command from
its Trenchardian roots to its struggle to develop an effective doctrine
throughout during the Second
World War in order to yield the
results envisioned by strategic
bombing advocates during the interwar period. Connelly’s narrative
hits upon all of the major elements
of the campaign (which have been
exhaustively explored) but he is at
his best when exploring the construction of Bomber Command’s image
during the war and the postwar
memory of its exploits. Using a wide
variety of sources such as wartime
propaganda films and press coverage, Connelly argues that these
shaped popular perceptions of
Bomber Command by presenting a
mix of “truths, half-truths and outright lies.” In a controversial contention, he asserts that despite this
incomplete picture, the British public deluded themselves as to the
nature of Bomber Command’s area
bombing campaign. As a corollary,
he contends that it was not Dresden that tarnished Bomber Command’s image but governmental
post-facto squeamishness regarding
the bombing campaign during the
immediate postwar era. Connelly’s
argument reaches the level of polemic with this point, for he does
not cite specific governmental evidence to support his assertion, reducing his argument to an overstated conspiracy theory in which
the government served as a

sequel to Hammel’s earlier
book Carrier Clash, about the
Battle of the Eastern Solomons in
August 1942, Carrier Strike looks
at the engagement that was a victory for the Japanese, but only in
the short-term. The Imperial Japanese Navy could claim victory in
October 1942 because the American carrier fleet withdrew from the
battle after losing the Hornet, the
eighth and newest of the US Navy’s
fleet carriers, the destroyer USS
Porter, and eighty of the 175 carrier aircraft which were committed
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moulder of the memory of Bomber
Command which an unquestioning
populace readily accepted. If, as he
believes, the British public knew the
“real” nature of Bomber Command’s
campaign and chose to accept it
during the war, why then did they
embrace the contradictory “official”
line in the postwar era? Conscience
may be part of it, but a more detailed assessment of this interesting aspect of social memory (and
forgetting) would have provided
increased clarity.
As well, despite emphasizing
the public’s horror of bombing during the 1920s and 1930s, Connelly
does not do the same for the nuclear age. This may have shed some
light on the postwar public’s unfavourable view of Bomber Command,
shaped by a fear that the next Battle of Britain may not turn out in
their favour. A broader discussion
of the postwar era would have more
clearly illuminated the nature of
Bomber Command’s memory. Still,
Connelly’s book is a valuable and
overdue addition to a crowded
historiography which goes a long
way to correcting the strange neglect
by historians of the making and
consumption of the image of a remarkably media conscious military
organization.
DR
*****
Eric Hammel, Carrier Strike: The
Battle of the Santa Cruz Islands,
October 1942 (Pacifica, CA:
Pacifica Military History, 1999),
$29.95 US, 409 pages, ISBN 0935553-37-1.

A

to the battle. The Japanese, although
they lost almost half of the aircraft
committed and suffered heavy damage to two carriers, were in control of that patch of ocean when the
battle drew to a close at the end of
October. However, the IJN was
never able to use its carrier force
again as a strategic weapon. The two
damaged carriers, as well as an undamaged flattop, were withdrawn
to Japan, leaving only the inadequate Junyo on duty in this active
theatre. It played no further role in
the Solomons campaign (although
it was the only survivor of the Santa
Cruz battle remaining afloat at war’s
end), and the destruction of most
of the rest of Japan’s carrier fleet
in the Philippine Sea in October
1944 put paid to Japan’s ambition
of projecting force through carrierbased aircraft.
Like all of Hammel’s book, this
one is a delight to read – gripping,
fast-paced, and full of action. He has
a knack for this kind of writing,
and has emerged as one of the
preeminent chroniclers of the Pacific War.
SL
*****
Col. A. Jalali and Lieut. Col. L.W.
Grau, The Other Side of the
Mountain: Mujahideen Tactics in
the Soviet Afghan War, vol. 1-3
(Milton Keynes, UK: Military Press,
2000), £59.57, 400 pages, ISBN 085420-365-6 (vol. 1), ISBN 085420-375-3 (vol. 2) , ISBN 085420-311-7 (vol. 3).

I

t would be difficult to conceive
of a more timely academic work
than this three-volume study of the
tactics, techniques, and procedures
used by Mujahideen forces during
their guerrilla war against the Soviet Union from 1979 to 1989.
In the mid-1990s the United
States Marine Corps sponsored the
authors’ study to enhance the body
of knowledge of Mujahideen tactics
and techniques. The authors
traveled to Pakistan where they interviewed a large number of
Mujahideen. The book consists entirely of case studies where firsthand accounts of individual actions
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are retold, followed by brief commentary by the authors. The battles
are described briefly over two to
three pages. A colour map accompanies every account. The quality
of the maps is excellent, and they
facilitate a fuller understanding of
the battle space. Be warned that the
authors utilize the former Soviet
map symbols, which may require
some adjustment for those used to
NATO symbology.
All students of asymmetrical
warfare will find this set extremely
valuable. In particular, those with
an interest in guerilla warfare at the
lowest tactical levels will delight in
this material. These are first-hand
accounts that, for the most part, are
free of third-party opinion or interpretation. The facts are presented simply and concisely, with
the analysis and commentary by the
authors clearly labeled as such.
This makes excellent fodder for
scenario-based tactical problemsolving exercises at both the NCO
and officer level.
The book is organized into a
number of subjects including ambush, raids, attacks on strong
points, dealing with counter-guerrilla tactics, and urban combat. The
relevance of this material to the
current conflicts in Afghanistan and
elsewhere is self-evident. This book
is highly recommended and should
be prerequisite reading for all military leaders deploying into a
theater where guerrilla warfare will
be encountered.
VI
*****
David Stafford, ed., Flight from
Reality: Rudolf Hess and His Mission to Scotland, 1941 (London:
Pimlico, 2002), $34.95, 182 pages,
ISBN 0-7126-8025-X.
Hugh Thomas, The Strange Death
of Heinrich Himmler: A Forensic
Examination (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2001), $38.95, 276
pages, ISBN 0-312-28923-5.

T

wo of the most enigmatic figures of the Third Reich are covered in these fascinating studies,

one of which attempts to put old
myths to rest, the other to stir up
an old orthodoxy. Much confusion
has surrounded the flight to Scotland of Rudolf Hess, Hitler’s
deputy, with conspiracy theorists
arguing, among other things, that
Hitler had foreknowledge of the
flight and that the pilot was not really Hess at all (and, by extension,
it was not really Hess who languished in Spandau prison for so
many years). These theories have
all rested on a number of dubious
details, including Hess’s cryptic
letters which he left behind to be
delivered to friends and family, his
skills as a pilot, and alleged discrepancies between the serial numbers of various aircraft which might
have been involved in the flight. To
refute these theories, David Stafford has assembled a panel of international experts to analyse specific aspects of the story: Len
Deighton on Hess the aviator, John
Erickson on the Soviet implications, Warren Kimball on the American angle, and Hugh Trevor-Roper
on “Hess the corrigible intruder.”
Taken together, these essays represent an effective demolition of the
mythology surrounding Hess, and
tell the story for what it really was:
the attempt by a credulous and deluded man to take action into his
own hands by flying into the heart
of enemy country to try to
destabilize Britain and thereby save
Germany from a two-front war.
Thomas’ book is rather different, although the thesis should
come as no surprise to anyone who
has read his earlier works The
Murder of Rudolf Hess and The
Murder of Adolf Hitler. Thomas’
subject this time is the
Reichsführer-SS, and the picture he
sketches of the young Himmler is
at once alarming and fascinating: an
unbelievably priggish fusspot with
a remarkable memory and an infinite faith in his own moral superiority over virtually anyone else
around him, he first ingratiated
himself with Hitler through his naive loyalty, but more importantly
because he owned a motorcycle at
a time when the National Socialists
found it difficult to scrape together
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funds for transportation. He
parlayed those humble beginnings
into perhaps the second most powerful, and certainly most feared
(even by many seniors Nazis) position in the Nazi state. It has long
been assumed that Himmler committed suicide shortly after his capture by British forces in north Germany in May 1945, but Thomas contends that the SS chief was one step
ahead of things. Convinced that the
Nazis would lose the war, he set
about feathering his own nest and
making private arrangements (usually through trusted allies) with
Swedish, Soviet, and British intelligence that were intended to secure him a haven after the war. It
was a double who died in British
hands, not Himmler, a contention
that is supported by the forensic
evidence introduced by Thomas:
the fact that the British were desperately keen to have Himmler’s
body buried quickly, without allowing the Soviets (who possessed the
only set of Himmler’s dental
records) to examine the body; the
exhaustive British autopsy made no
mention of the facial scar of which
Himmler was inordinately proud;
the fact that the corpse did not really look like Himmler, even allowing for facial contortions caused by
the poison; and a number of other
factors. Thomas is too careful to
be dogmatic, and admits that he
cannot prove the body was not
Himmler’s, but the evidence he introduces is suggestive – enough
that the book will likely provoke
debate for some time.
CA
*****
Jonathan F. Vance, High Flight:
Aviation and the Canadian Imagination (Toronto: Penguin
Canada, 2002), $35.00, 338 pages,
ISBN 0-14-301345-9.

W

ith this book, the author of the
award-winning Death So Noble: Memory, Meaning and the
First World War turns his hand to
a different subject, the impact of the
airplane on public attitudes in
Canada. It is an approach that has
interested historians in Europe and
the United States, so Vance has the
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benefit of some solid studies to use
as models. The result is an absorbing and beautifully written account
of why flying has maintained such
a hold on Canada’s imagination.
Vance begins with the balloon
age, but quickly moves into the
early days of heavier-than-air flying machines, when hucksters and
pioneers alike tried to demonstrate
the capabilities of the airplane. In
doing so, they came up against a
public which saw the new technology as a gimmick that would soon
pass, and governments which saw
no useful purpose in taking to the
air. Not until the interwar era was
flying embraced by business, government, and by the general public; even then, it took the Second
World War to transform flying from
a pursuit of the few to something
that touched the lives of many.
Understandably, much of the
focus is on military aviation. Vance
describes the “knights of the air”
image which evolved during the

First World War, arguing that it so
captured the imagination because it
allowed this most modern war to
be interpreted in a comforting traditional framework. The strategic
bombing campaign, the first in history, could be interpreted in the
same way, as a kind of medieval
morality play in which evil German
bombers and zeppelins were met
by Allied scout pilots who acted as
avenging angels. But even with the
horrors of the Great War, the interwar era saw the airplane become
an instrument of peace; opposing
aviators like Billy Bishop and Ernst
Udet became new comrades, and
the zeppelin became a symbol of
international amity. This comforting delusion lasted until the Spanish Civil War, when the destruction
of Guernica convinced Canada (and
the world) that the bloom was off
the airplane. Suddenly, air raid
precautions became a concern of
every Canadian community, and
when the Allied air forces finally

developed the capability to strike
back at Germany from the skies,
the Canadian public was enthusiastic, revelling in the fact that the Allies now had the technology to flatten German cities. In another section, Vance discusses the increasing technological sophistication of
airplanes that was fostered by the
Second World War, and the degree
to which other aircrew members
grew in importance and the pilot
increasingly became simply a driver
of an airborne bus.
For anyone who has marvelled
at an air show, spent hours building model airplanes, or simply been
fascinated by aviation without really knowing why, this book will be
a delight. It conjures up the magic
of early flying, and would be a wonderful way to pass a few hours in
the airport when you’re waiting for
a cancelled flight or looking for your
lost luggage.
DAR

Briefly Noted

Sharon Grant Wildwind, Dreams
That Blister Sleep: A Nurse in Vietnam (Edmonton: River Books,
1999), $17.95 paper, 218 pages,
ISBN 1-895836-70-0

with the reconnaissance squadron
of The Royal Canadian Dragoons in
Cyprus in 1989, and five years after leaving the Army, a course in
photography behind him, he spent
some time with The Queen’s York
Rangers, a reserve reconnaissance
unit. The Commanding Officer gave
him full access to document the
unit’s training exercises and daily
life, and in return Batten produced
this fine collection of photographs
which portray the texture of the life
of a modern reservist. The blackand-white photographs are
uncaptioned (short introductory
essays by Bob Kennedy open each
chapter), but they really need no
captions because the images are so
powerful. Anyone who has spent any
time in the military will be familiar
with the scenes – cleaning the machine gun after fire exercises, the
first time in the gas hut, constructing an observation post, the new
recruit’s first day. They have a dignity and strength about them that
is compelling, and they show a side
of today’s soldiers that most people never observe in the twenty-sec-

Bruce Catton, Charles P. Roland,
David Donald, and T. Harry
Williams, Grant, Lee, Lincoln and
the Radicals: Essays on Civil War
Leadership (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press [distributed in Canada by Scholarly Book
Services], 2001), $21.50 paper, 117
pages, ISBN 0-8071-2742-6.

I

n 1964, four preeminent scholars of the US Civil War presented
papers at Northwestern University
to mark the centenary of the conflict. Those essays were collected
into a volume which subsequently
became one of the landmarks in
Civil War history. Reprinted here
for the first time, they are accompanied by a new introduction and
preface which describe why the essays have stood the test of time, and
why they remain essential reading
for anyone interested in the Civil
War, or in military leadership generally.
*****
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S

haron Grant left her home in
Louisiana to find freedom, but
ending up finding much more on
her year-long tour of duty as a nurse
in Vietnam. This searing memoir,
which mixes entries from the author’s diary with reflections written long after the fact, gives a frank
picture of what it was like to minister to the wounded in south-eats
Asia. It is not M*A*S*H* or even
China Beach – but rather an honest and often brutal account of the
wounds of war and of one human
spirit that coped with them to the
best of her ability.
*****
David Batten and Bob Kennedy, To
the Trace: Imagery of Soldiering
(Toronto: Spadina Rhetoric, 2000),
$50.00, 227 pages, no ISBN.

D

avid Batten served as the staff
photographer while serving
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ond sound bytes that grace the
nightly news.
*****
Thomas D. Cockrell and Michael
B. Ballard, eds., A Mississippi
Rebel in the Army of Northern
Virginia: The Civil War Memoirs
of Private David Holt (Baton
Rouge: Louisiana State University
Press [distributed in Canada by
Scholarly Book Services], 2001),
$29.75 paper, 370 pages, ISBN 08071-2734-5.

A

fter David Holt retired as an
Episcopal minister, his son persuaded him to fill his idle hours
by recording his recollections of
his experiences during the Civil
War. By the time of his death in
1925, Holt had written some fifty
short chapters, covering everything
from his early childhood on a Mississippi plantation to his capture in
1864, when his company attempted
to retake a section of railway line
that was a vital supply route for
Confederate forces. It is an illuminating and often humorous account
of an affluent young man’s journey
through some of the fiercest battles
of the war: Fredericksburg,
Chancellorsville, Gettysburg, the
Wilderness. Concluding the volume
are excerpts from Holt’s 1865 diary, covering his experiences after
being released from captivity.
*****
Bernd Horn, ed., Forging a Nation: Perspectives on the Canadian Military Experience (St.
Catharines, ON: Vanwell, 2002), 416
pages, ISBN 1-55125-090-X
Yves Tremblay, ed., Canadian Military History since the 17th Century: Proceedings of the Canadian Military History Conference,
Ottawa, 5-9 May 2000 (Ottawa:
Directorate of History and Heritage,
2001), 591 pages, no ISBN.

F

or the sheer breadth of material covered, it’s difficult to beat
these two collections. Horn’s book
contains nineteen essays and
Tremblay’s boasts an impressive
fifty-seven articles (albeit most quite

short). Together, they surely address every conceivable aspect of
conflict in Canadian history, from
“French Strategic Ideas in the Defence of the Cod Fishery, 16631713” (F.J. Thorpe) to “Glued to its
Seat: Canada and its Alliances in
the Post-Cold War Era” (Joel
Sokolsky), and include the work
of the country’s best military historians. What’s more, there is very
little overlap between the two
books, either in terms of subject
matter or authorship, so that the
reader who buys both can be confident of not reading the same material twice. It is always possible to
quibble with trifles – Forging a
Nation, for example, contains just
a single article on the First World
War, the conflict that is usually understood as having forged the Canadian nation – but the collections
confirm that military history in
Canada is in fine fettle.
*****
John C. Fredriksen, Green Coats
and Glory: The United States
Regiment of Riflemen, 18081821 (Youngstown, NY: Fort
Niagara Publications, 2000), $12.95
US paper, 80 pages, ISBN 0941967-22-0.

L

amenting that the historiography
of the US Army in the early
nineteenth century is “intolerably
stagnant,” Fredriksen has re sponded with this brief but well
researched history of the Regiment
of Riflemen. Authorized by Thomas
Jefferson in 1808, the unit had its
baptism of fire at the Battle of
Tippecanoe in 1811 and served in
the Patriot War in Florida before
coming north to fight in the War of
1812. Perhaps its greatest successes
were the ambush at Sandy Creek
in May 1814 and the defense of
Conjockta Creek in August. The
following year, the four regiments
were down-sized into one, and in
1821 the unit was disbanded altogether. It was a sad end for what
Fredriksen aptly calls the most effective US infantry formation in the
War of 1812.

F

ew nineteenth-century American
soldiers had the breadth of
military experience that William
Harney did. He commanded troops
in almost every conflict between the
War of 1812 and the Civil War: operations against the Lafitte pirates
in Louisiana, the Black Hawk War,
the Second Seminole War, the Mexican-American War, campaigns
against the Plains Indians, peacekeeping in Kansas and Utah.
Adams characterizes him as bold,
ambitious and innovative, but also
vindictive, impulsive, and violent,
and notes that he lived by a philosophy he recorded in his diary
in 1868: “The power of the sword
in a free country is never to be invoked but to repel invasion, quell
insurrection, & to enforce the law.”
*****
Tonie and Valmai Holt, My Boy
Jack?: The Search for Kipling’s
Only Son (Barnsley, UK: Leo
Cooper, 2001), £12.95 paper, 236
pages, ISBN 0-85052-859-3.

O

n 27 September 1915, John,
the son of the world famous
author Rudyard Kipling, was reported missing in the Battle of
Loos. Having pulled every string to
get his myopic son into the Irish
Guards, Kipling was devastated by
the loss and determined to find his
final resting place. Despite his influential position and a life-long
search, he never succeeded in his
quest. The Holts, better known for
their series of battlefield tour
books, take up the search, beginning with the 1992 decision of the
Commonwealth War Graves Commission to alter a previously unidentified grave to denote that it held
the remains of John Kipling. They
argue that the decision was mistaken, and note that the matter is
still before the British Ministry of
Defence.

*****
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George Rollie Adams, General
William S. Harney, Prince of Dragoons (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2001), $60 US, 389
pages, ISBN 0-8032-1058-2.
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